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The Military Services are perpetually being criticized for waste and
inefficiency.
Beginning with the Founders of the Government of the United States* the
men who framed and adopted the Constitution, and continuing until the present,
there has been continuous and vocal criticism of things military.
The American statesmen who were the architects of our political system
were working at a time, and in an area, when there was considerable criticism
1
of the military. As pointed out by Elias Huzar, during the time of Alexander
Hamilton and James Madison, it was considered by many that disciplined armies
bore "a malignant aspect to liberty and economy!" that they might become a
drain on the nation's resources and a means of enslaving the people? that
liberty might once more be "crushed between standing armies and perpetual
taxes," not to mention economic "regimentation" to insure supply of the sinews
of war. The Founders were concerned lest the military and naval forces they
authorized be employed not only against foreign foes but also against domestic
freedoms. The conclusion drawn by Elias Huzar was that, at the time of the
framing and adoption of the Constitution, "by consenus, standing armies were a
2
threat to civil liberties and economic prosperity. "
1
Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword (Ithaca, New York* Cornell




2Senator Faul H. Douglas has very conveniently described numerous
examples that constitute, in effect, continuing criticisms of the Military
1
Services. According to Senator Douglas, "the military authorities are, in fact,
2
probably the greatest wasters of manpower and materials in the country;" it was
reported by former Defense Secretary Louis Johnson that the Navy had on hand
3
enough anchors to last fifty years? Senator Douglas reports that the Department
of Defense had on hand supplies of certain jeep parts sufficient to last up to
4
104 years; that "there is a general failure among procurement officers to
5
realize the need for economy;" that the specifications for ping-pong balls
6
required five and a half pages of single-spaced typing. These examples have
been picked at random from among a numerous variety from which to choose. It
is sufficient for the purposes of this paper to state that they all are in some
way related to the problems involved with military budget making.
Another typical and more recent example was an article in The Wall
7
Street Journal under the heading: "Advisory Group Finds Waste, Inefficiency in
Military Budget Making. "
My purpose in preparing this paper is not to excuse the military for
past mistakes, nor to attempt to explain subsequent failures, but rath&r '< o
create an understanding of the major problems involved in the annual preparation
of budget estimates, so that criticisms in connection with military budget
making may be more intelligently appraised.
1
Paul H. Douglas, Economy in the National Government (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1952).
2 3 4 5
Ibid.








Chapter I attempts to highlight some of the more important factors that
complicate and make difficult the estimates process in preparation of the
budget. Some definitions are furnished to facilitate the discussion in
subsequent chapters*
The mechanics of government budget preparation include involved and
lengthy processes. During recent years the time factor has increased
tremendously in importance. Not only has the period of time between
Congressional approval of an appropriation and the receipt of the goods and
services authorized becoue increasingly important, and much longer, but the
period of time between tfce initial preparation of budget estimates and
Congressional approval has also increased. In Chapter II these links between
budget preparation and budget execution will be examined in more detail, and
an attempt will be made to indicate the complexity of this time-consuming
process.
There are inherent difficulties incident to integrating planning,
programming, budgeting, and operating, in the Military Services. It is usually
recognized that these functions must be closely and intimately related if the
maximum benefits are to be derived from the annual budget estimates. It is
essential that these differing concepts be correlated to the greatest possible
extent.
Two distinct approaches to the budgeting process are usually recognized

they are the historical budget principles, supporting legislative control, and
1
those principles designed from the point of view of executive management, it
would appear that the most effective budgeting will require the reconciliation
of these two distinct approaches.
It will be recalled that Communist aggression in Korea began in June
1950. Obviously, this state of affairs would be expected to be reflected in
military budget estimates for subsequent periods. Actually, the projected cost
of combat in Korea was omitted from the annual budget estimates every year after
fiscal year 1951. The effects of this high-level policy were to further
complicate the estimating and reviewing processes in connection with military
budget making.
Although most detailed descriptions of the principal steps in the
estimates process in preparation of the budget indicate that "agency ceilings",
on the basis of the President's decisions, are set approximately six months
2
prior to submission of budget estimates to Congress, this information, even
though possibly available to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and other
high-level authorities, is not available at the working level where the budget
estimates are being prepared. This condition results in "crash" reductions in
budgetary estimates to conform to a ceiling or top limit imposed from above at
a time when most departmental budget estimates are essentially completed.
1
Harold D. Smith, The Management of Your Government (JUew York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc. , 1945), sec. 2, chap. vii.
2
Douglas, Economy in the National Government , part 1, chap. iii.

Budgets, and budget estimates, have been defined in numerous ways. The
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) defines them as
follows:
budget, n. (1) A statement, in financial terms, of projected or
expected operations of an accounting entity for a given period. When
applicable, it should include a statement of the effect of such operations
on financial condition at the end of the period. (2) (Govt) A formal
estimate of future revenues, obligations to be incurred, and expenditures
to be made during a definite period of time. (A budget for a succeeding
period frequently is supported by comparative figures for current and
preceding fiscal periods.)
business-type budget, n. A statement, in financial terms, of projected
or anticipated operations of an accounting entity (q.v. ) ^ a given
period. It usually represents a goal — not a limitation — and may be
revised from time to time within a period to reflect changing conditions
which may have an effect on future operations.
departmental budget, n. A budget prepared on behalf of a single
Department or Agency of the Government.
budget estimate, n. An amount estimated for any element included in a
budget.
budget execution, n. The implementation of the budget program as
adjusted by contingencies during the applicable fiscal period.
budget justification, n. The supporting statements and data used to
prove the requirement of the amount in a budget estimate.
budget of the United States, n. A budget for the Government of the
United States submitted anually by the President to the Congress reflecting
estimated receipts, expenditures and appropriations proposed, the financial
condition of the Treasury and comparative amounts fpr curreiit and preceding
years with such other detail as is required by law.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Navy refers to the budget, a3
approved by Congress, as the overall financial plan against which the Navy will
2
operate in the fiscal year.
The Navy Comptroller Manual defines budget estimate as follows;
The budget estimate of the Department of the Navy is a detailed estimate
of the sums required to be appropriated for the Naval Establishment to
support the Navy Program Objectives. The Navy Program Objectives are
prepared by the Chief of Naval Operations assisted by th§ Comptroller of
the Navy, and are approved by the Secretary of the Navy.
I
"
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Glossary
of Terms used in Comptroller Activities
,
(Washington: 25 January 1952).
2
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy, The Navy Budget in Brief for
Fiscal Year 1955 , (Washington: 30 June 1954).
3
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy, Navy Comptroller Manual , Vol. I]
(Washington: 4 February 1952).

Senator Ralph E. Flanders has the following concept of a performance
budget
:
A performance budget is one in which all costs incidental to the
accomplishment of a specific job or objective are consolidated into an
identifiable project, with projects logically grouped into primary function*
and In which, insofar as possible, fiscal responsibility and management
responsibility are parallel. It contemplates a separation of capital
expenditures from current operating expenditures* The performance budget
is designed to focus attention upon the general character and relative
importance of the work to be done or upon the service to be rendered,
rather than upon the things to be acquired such as personal services,
supplies, equipment, etc.
It is generally agreed that all of the Military Services have made
progress in the direction of performance budgeting, with the IJavy having
perhaps approached more closely to the standards demanded by the Congress.
However, there are still exceptions in all the Military Services, with military
personnel costs being the classical example of non-performance in a performance
budget. The testimony of Mr. H. Lee White, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
is considered as being quite clear and illustrative concerning this problem:
Question 5. -Shy have not military personnel costs been identified with
the function to which the cost relates in the preparation of performance
budgets?
Answer. -Military personnel costs have not been included in the budgets
for operating functions hut are shown separately for several reasons:
(a) Because the Air Force appropriation structure approved by the
Congress provides that all military costs will be grouped under one
appropriation heading.
(b) The Congress has consistently indicated its desire to control the
troop strength in the Military Establishment by specific appropriations.
(c) Central regulation and administration is indicated as the most
economical procedure because of the substantial body of law and regulation
presently governing the pay and employment of military personnel.
1
U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Freparedness Subcommittee
No. 3 of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.
,
on Implementation of Title I?, National Security Act of 1947, as Amended,







Formulation of the annual Navy budget estimates is a huge task which
requires wide participation. It has been estimated that the annual cost of
1
preparing the Federal budget estimates is $30,000,000. The Assistant Secretary
of the Navy, in December 1951, estimated that the preparation* of the annual
2
Navy budget estimates were costing approximately 5 to 8 million dollars. The
major portion of this cost was for manpower hours alone. There is no reason to
believe that these costs have decreased in subsequent years.
A flow chart shov-ing the development of annual Navy budget estimates
is shown in Figure 1.
These steps are described in considerable detail in the Navy Comptrollea
Manual t
022050 PRINCIP.il STEPS IN PREPARATION OF 3UDGET
The annual budget estimate of the Navy is prepared in the following
main steps t
1. the Director of the Bureau of the Budget requests the Secretary of
Defense to submit the Department of Defense budget estimate for an ensuing
fiscal year;
2* the Secretary of Defense provides policies, assumptions and guide
lines for budget preparation, including over-all strategic concepts and
force levels developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and directs the
Secretary of the Navy to prepare the budgetary requirements of the
Department of the Navy.
1
Paul Haase, "^30 Million Just to Draft Budget," The Controller ,
February , 1954, p. 57.
2
Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for the Under
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93. the Secretary of the Navy determines the Department of the Navy
policies, directs preparation of and reviews and approves the Navy Program
Objectives;
4. with the assistance of the Comptroller of the Navy, the Chief of
Naval Operations prepares the Navy Program Objectives for issue to the
bureaus and offices of the Department of the Navy, at which time the
Comptroller of the Navy issues a "Call for Estimates" requesting bureaus
and offices to submit their requirements and the estimated cost thereof to
meet the Navy Frogram Objectives;
5. the Comptroller of the Navy holds hearings; reviews the estimates of
the bureaus and offices to assure propriety, soundness, economy, and
compliance with the Objectives; makes revisions as required; and instructs
the bureaus and offices us to the form and content of final estimates and
justifications
;
6. the Secretary of the Navy, after review and revision by the Budget
Advisory Committee, approves and transmits the Department of the Navy budget
estinate to the Secretary of Defense;
7. the Comptroller of the Department of Defense holds hearings, reviews
the budget estimate, coordinates the budgets of all the military departments
and recommends the budget to be submitted by the Secretary of Defense to
the Bureau of the Budget;
8. the Director of the Bureau of the Budget reviews the estimates and
justifications, makes revisions to show the policy of the Fresident, and
prepares the President's budget document for submission to the Congress
by the President.
022051 BY CONGRESS
The budget presented to Congress by the President is thoroughly
reviewed and investigated first in the House of Representatives, then in
the Senate. An appropriation bill, containing the budget figures as
modified by changes agreed upon by both the House and the Senate, is
passed by Congress and forwarded to the President for his signature.
022052 BY THE PRESIDENT
The appropriation bill, when signed by the President, becomes a
law and an appropriation act.
022053 BY THE TREASURY DB -COUNTING OFFICE
Upon receipt of a copy of the appropriation act, the Treasury
Department draws an appropriation warrant and forwards it to the General
Accounting Office for countersignature. The General Accounting Office
analyzes the appropriation act. Each appropriation warrant, if determined
to be in accordance with the act, is countersigned, the amount recorded,
and the countersigned warrant returned to the Treasury Department. The
Treasury Department records the amount of each appropriation. A copy of
each warrant is forwarded to the Navy Department as a notification that
the appropriation is available for obligation and expenditure.
Following the major policy decisions by the President and members of
hia Cabinet, including the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, concerning
_
Navy Comptroller ilanual , Vol. II, part A, sec. 2
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broad budget policy, and the resulting tentative ceiling for the Federal budget
estimates, the Department of Defense will receive from the Bureau of the Budget
a call for budget estimates. This call can be expected in June or early July
for the fiscal year beginning approximately one year later.
The first step in Navy budget formulation, within the Department of
Defense, is taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who develop joint over-all
strategic concepts and force levels. These broad determinations are then passed
to the Secretary of Defense who issues an annual directive setting forth
budgetary responsibilities; policies and assumptions governing plan preparation
standards with respect to training, aircraft operations, manpower utilization,
etc. ; and establishing the Department of Defense budget estimates time table.
This directive is based on planning at the National level, and encompasses
considerations that have been coordinated with the President, the Department of
State, the National Security Council, and other high-level policy-making
activities. However, this first step has not worked out in practice. Generally,
if received at all by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, these
"Secretary of Defense Guidelines" have come too late to be of any assistance,
and the Services have had to proceed without the benefit of over-all policies
and planning guides governing budget preparation furnished by the Secretary
of Defense.
Upon receipt of the Secretary of Defense directive, or if none is
forthcoming, then without it, the Secretary of the Navy directs plan preparation
to go forward for the Naval Establishment, and prescribes such instructions
regarding Navy policies and plans as he deems appropriate and necessary. In the
preparation of these plans, the Secretary of the Navy is advised by the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Navy Comptroller. The Chief of Naval Operations
prepares and promulgates a budget-guidance document known as "Budget Program

11
Objectives." These plans are based on plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concerning forces » ships, aircraft, personnel, etc. These Budget Program
Objectives interpret and make applicable to the Wavy, in more specific terms,
the more broadly stated rules received from, or assumed to be approved by,
higher authority.
As soon as the Budget Program Objectives have been approved by the
Secretary of the Navy and promulgated, the Navy Comptroller issues a "Call for
Estimates. ** This document, transmitted to the bureaus and offices of the
Department of the Navy, including the Commandant of the Marine Corps, cites the
Secretary of Defense Guidelines , if available, and the Navy's Budget Program
Objectives as the documents on which Navy budget programs will be based.
Essentially, it contains instructions as to format and timing, but in addition,
cites certain specific data which are to be prepared and submitted with the
budget estimates book as "back-up" or substantiating information. These back-up
data, generally in tabular form, are intended for use by the budget analysts
to aid them in studying the budget programs and in determining that budget
programs are within the intent of the Budget Program Objectives and Department
of Defense policies.
As a matter of general practice, the Navy bureaus do not wait for the
call for estimates by the Secretary of the Navy (Comptroller of the Navy) to
start their preparation of budget estimates. The process of assembling data
which would be required in any event in the preparation of budget estimates
would have already commenced. However, the data could not be put in budget
.program form until the call for estimates had been received from the Comptroller
of the Navy. It is at this point that the problems of budget formulation really
begin, and it thin becomes evident that no set of rules can be written in such
detail and specific terms as to be uniformly interpreted by all of the bureaus
and offices of the Department of the Navy. Efforts are made, therefore, by the
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Office of the Comptroller of the Navy to assure that proper interpretations
are made, although the real impact of misinterpretations of guidance documents
is not known until the budget estimates have been submitted.
After the bureaus and offices of the Department of the Navy have
prepared and submitted their budget estimates, as per schedule, the estimates,
still considered to be in the forrnulative stage, are reviewed and analysed in
detail by the Estimates and Analysis Division of the Office of the Comptroller
of the Navy. The purposes of this review and analysis include: determination
that the budget estimates conform to Budget Program Objectives, and to the
Secretary of Defense and Bureau of the Budget policy guidance; development of
area? requiring policy decisions; assurances that the budget estimates meet
criteria for economy, feasibility, and efficiency; assurances that the budget
estimates provide for proper balance between inter-related programs 5 familiar-
ization of the Comptroller and his principal assistants and staff members with
the contents of the budget estimates.
As a result of review and analysis of the budget estimates by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy, changes from previous budgets, and
trends, are determined; divergence, if any, from budgetary plans are determined;
basis for pricing is learned; and the inclusion of unsupported programs and
items are ascertained.
As the review and analysis continues, the cognizant bureaus and offices
of the Department of the Navy are contacted and their budget estimates
discussed to clarify questionable programs and other areas, and to develop
additional information.
Following this review and analysis by the Estimates and Analysis
Division of the Office of the Comptroller of the Navy, the Comptroller and his
principal assistants hold their budget hearings mth the cognizant bureaus and
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offices of the Department of the Navy. At this time, representatives of the
Chief of Naval Operations present detailed program plans and directives, and
the bureaus and offices justify their budget estimates. This phase of the
review generally takes about six weeks, and it is during this period that the
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy develops in detail those areas that are
considered to require policy decision from the Chief of Naval Operations
and/or the Secretary of the Navy. After further clarification or policy
redetermination from higher authority, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Navy prepares mark-up recommendations , which, \shen approved by the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy, are distributed to the bureaus
and offices of the Department of the Navy. At this time, the recipients of
these marked-up budget estimates are given an opportunity to submit appeals,
which are reviewed and resolved by the Budget Advisory Committee* as a result
of the determinations of the Budget Advisory Committee, and as approved by tho
Secretary of the Navy, the budget estimates are thereby determined for the Navy],
and these budget estimates are then transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.
The Comptroller of the Department of Defense transmits the budget
estimates of all the military services to the Bureau of the Budget. The
schedule requires their submission on or before 15 September.
Then follows the budget hearings by the Bureau of the Budget and the
Department of Defense. After the necessary revisions have been made, the
budget estimates are incorporated into the President's budget, and submitted
-to the Congress in January.
Following detailed Congressional review and hearings on the budget
estimates, the passage of the Appropriation Acts, usually in June or July,
determines the status of the budget for the fiscal year then beginning.
The foregoing discu-sion of the development of annual budget estimates
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was presented to indicate the complexity of this time- consuming process. Many
of the initial steps are required to be taken during the first half of the
calendar year and actually begin eighteen months in advance of the fiscal year
for which the estimates are prepared, or thirty months in advance of the close
of r-uch fiscal year.
The military budgets, with their exceedingly long span embracing both
budget preparation and budget execution, can hardly be considered only as an
annual proposition. As former President Truman wrote in one of bis et
messages
:
This fact is that the financial program of the Government cannot be
planned in terms of a single fiscal year. It must be planned in the light of
security, economic, and budgetary goals-not just for the ensuing year but for
three and even four years ahead. 1
Generally speaking, there is a period of approximately three years for
general procurement items obtained by the Bureau of Ordnance between their
inclusion in budget estimates and tfcelr receipt.
A chart showing the expected lead-times for Navy prototype ships is
shown in Figure 2.
The HUSS Forrestal" is an extreme example of the time factor in connection
with budget estimates. Funds were obtained by the Navy from Congress in the
budget for fiscal year 1952 for this ship. Actual building time is approximately
four years. Allowing approximately nine months for the preparation of
preliminary designs by the Bureau of Ships and the determination of
characteristics by the Chief of Naval Operations; another eight months for the
preparation of contract plans and specifications by the Bureau of Ships;
The Budget of
i
the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending
June 30, 1954 , p. U 54, quoted in Frederick C. Mosher, Program Budgeting: Theory


































































































































approximately four months to award the contract; and four years for building,
the time factor has become almost bewilderingly important. It is submitted that
tl. e inherent difficulties involved in planning and budgeting for items




OKBATJOU OF PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND OPERATING
The relationship between the provision of guide lines affecting plans,
forces, and programs on the one hand, and money limitations on the other hand,
obviously presents a major problem in the financing of Naval programs. B^ . ^^
ing and planning are necessarily linked; in fact, one is part and parcel of the
other. However, there are real difficulties involved in integrating planning,
programming, budgeting, and operating. An excellent general summary of these
presented
problems has been/by Frederick C. Mo-heri
From the standpoint of the development of the military plans that are
precedent to military budgets, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its constituent
organizations are dominantly important. The Joint Chiefs, its committees, and
the Joint Staff which services them are military bodies consisting of officers
serving ex officio or detailed or assigned to this duty for a limited number of
years from the three services. The machinery of the Joint Chiefs thus provides
continuing channels for the flow of information, plans, and points of view back
and forth between the services and the coordinating center.
A major difficulty of military nlanning in the recent past has resulted
from the tardiness or the sporadic arrival of the basic agreed plans from the
hub of the wheel-the Joint Chiefs. It is therefore doubly significant that a new
"plan for planning" was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1952 and is now
being put into effect. This is a carefully designed scheme for annual planning,
geared to the calendar and comprehensive in its scope. When it is fully imple-
mented, it should provide the services with a firm base from which to launch
their internal planning activities. It will furnish assurance to planners and
managers at lower echelons that the JCS plans will arrive on time in accordance
with an understood schedule, thus reducing the necessity of anticipatory
planning and "crash" adjustments.
Under the new scheme, the planning activities of the Joint Staff, as weli
as the plans themselves, are divided into three main types according to the
time pei&od covered. Long-range plans are projected annually a number of
years in advance and are useful and necessary especially for the guidance of
research and development activities. Short-range plans, likewise prepared
annually, are designed to guide current operations and to provide immediate




essentially "requirements'1 documents, the short-range are premised on
currently available resources and capabilities.
Standing midway between these two, both as to time covered and as to
the type of planning approach, are plans of medium range. They are designed
to translate national policy into strategy and objectives that are
considered to be attainable. They are thus basically requirements
statements, but they take into consideration current and foreseeable
resource capabilities. These are the most important from the budget
standpoint since they provide the premises for most of the programming of
the services, for the preparation of the annual budgets, and for
mobilization planning. For purposes of medium-range planning, a D-Day is
assumed annually to occur on July 1 at the conclusion of a budget year. The
plan itself covers the period following D-Day, but it forms the basis for
the preparation of the budget in the fiscal year preceding D-Day. Thus a
plan applicable to the fiscal years 1957 and 1958 would be based upon an
assumed D-Day of July 1, 1956 and would furnish the basis for the budget
for fiscal year 1956.
One of the difficulties of the projected scheme is the distance in time
between the development of the plan and the period to which the plan applies
This problem is itself partly caused by the length of time involved in the
budget process. If one year, or a little less, is allowed for the develop-
ment of service programs based upon the JGS plans, and another year, or a
little more, is allowed for the development, review, and passage of the
annual budget, it is apparent that the JCS plans should be completed about
two years before the budget year is to begin, or three years before the
assumed D-Day. To this period must of course be added the several months
that the joint agencies themselves require for the development and considera-
tion of the basic plan. It is apparent that this phase of the planning
process must proceed on assumptions that are vulnerable to frequent and
sometimes violent change in the intervening period.
Another difficulty, perhaps inevitable in a planning process of such
scope and dimension, is the tremendous complexity of the system. Not only
must the plans for different terms of time be meshed with each other, but,
at any given moment, plans of the same term but applicable to different
years will be in various stages of development and application. These, too,
must be related. And all must be related to the planning and operations thai;
are simultaneously proceeding at both 1 igher and lower echelons. A decision
modifying one plan at one time, as, for example, a cut imposed by the Bureau
of the Budget on the estimates for a given year, might directly or indirect-
ly force modifications on a whole series of JCS and service plans, not only
for that year but for many other years as well, and not only for medium-
range plans but for plans of both shorter and longer range. In a fast-
moving world, keeping plans up-to-date and in tune with the times and with
each other is no small problem.
The divorce between Kilitary planning and budgetary planning is an
additional difficulty. The Secretary of Defense and his staff aids
apparently have no official role in developing or reviewing the basic plans
of the joint agencies. When they undertake to analyze the budgetary
offspring of the joint plans, more than a year after their preparation,
they must either accept the premises as "given" or threaten to injure or
warp the sense of the plans themselves, plans which they had no official
part in creating and for which they are not responsible. Conversely, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body has no further role or responsibility with
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respect to the annual budget although the budget is presumably predicated
upon the basic objectives and plans JCS has initially approved.
Comments concerning the failure of the military services to properly
integrate their planning! programming, budgeting, and operating functions have
not been confined to text writers. Similar comments were noted in a very recent
report by a committee studying military financial management. Ike Advisory
Committee on Fiscal Organization and Procedures, set up in August, 1953, by
Defense Secretary Charles Wilson to recommend improvements in the fiscal
structures of the Department of Defense has gone on record as deploring the
"failure to recognize the need for conducting both military planning and
2
budgeting as an integrated operation."
1
Kosher, Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice , chap. iii.
2




The military budget is both an instrument of legislative control and
executive management. It is generally considered that there is some conflict
between these two objectives, but that reconcilation is possible.
The former Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Harold Di Smith,
defines the historical budget principles that are devised primarily as aids of
legislative control as follows:
%* The principle of publicity . The main stages of the budget process,
- which include executive recommendations , legislative consideration and
action, and budget execution, should be made public.
2. The principle of clarity . The budget should be understandable to
every citizen. As was said by a British writer in 1764: "The administration
has condescended ... to explain the budget to the meanest capacity.
"
3. The principle of comprehensiveness . The budget should contain
expenditures and revenues on a gross basis, reflecting all governmental
activities without exception, and should show the surplus available for
debt retirement or the deficit to be met by new revenue legislation or
borrowing.
4. The principle of budget unity . All receipts should be recovered into
one general fund for financing all expenditures. This principle condemns
earmarking of revenues for specific purposes of expenditure except in cases
of trust accounts or in cases where a special and direct relationship exists
between receipts and expenditures.
5. The principle of detailed specification . Receipts and appropriations
should be expressed in detailed specification; transfer of items should be
permitted only in exceptional cases.
6. The principle of prior authorization . The budget should be submitted,
considered, and acted upon in advance of the period during which the
expenditures are to be made? it should include estimates for all foreseeable
needs, thus reducing as far as possible requests for supplemental and
deficiency appropriations. Budget execution should stay strictly within the
legislative authorization and should be checked by an auditing agency
reporting to the legislature*
7. The principle of periodicity . Appropriations should be authorized for




period should generally lapse or be reappropriated with specific amount
and purpose.
8. The principle ox accuracy * This principle demands that budget
estimates should be as accurate as possible, and condemns "padding" of
expenditure estimates or providing for hidden reserves by underestimating
revenues. 1
The same author also defines the budget principles that are devised
primarily from the point of view of executive management as follows
x
1. The principle of executive budget programming * The budget, as
recommended, reflects the program of the chief executive. ..hen enacted it
becomes the work program of the government, reflecting all government
responsibilities and activities in their political, economic, and social
aspects. Budget formulation, therefore, must be geared closely and directly
to the formulation of the chief executive^ program as a whole. Budgeting
and programming are the two sides of the same coin; both must be under the
direct supervision of the chief executive. This principle holds true for all
governments-Federal, state, local.
2. The principle of executive budget responsibility . The appropriation
ordinarily authorizes, it does not direct, an agency to spend money. The
executive branch is directed to fulfill the fu established by law or
implied in the language of the appropriation measure. In other words, the
appropriation is not a mandate to spend; nor does it establish a "vested
right" of an agency. The agency is responsible, under the direction of the
chief executive, for executing the intent of the legislation in the most
economical manner. The chief executive, for his part, has the responsibility
of seeing that the agency programs are brought into accord with legislative
intent and are executed with the greatest possible economy.
3. The principle of budget reporting . Preparation of the budget,
legislative action, and budget execution must be based on full financial and
operating reports flowing up from the administrative units of the
government. Current information should be furnished the executive as well as
the legislative branch on the work progress with respect to various programs
and projects, obligations incurred, expenditures made, revenues received,
individuals employed, objectives accomplished, and other relevant facts-
Budgeting without such reporting would be blind and arbitrary.
4. The principle of adequate budget "tool
s
i* Executive responsibility
requires adequate administrative tools. The chief executive must have under
his direct supervision a properly staffed budget organization. In addition,
certain powers must be available to the executive in order to assure the
most economical execution of legislative intent. These include, among others
authority to make monthly or quarterly allotment of appropriations and to
set up reserves out of appropriations. The reserves are to be used in case
of contingencies or are to lap<?e unexpended if changed conditions permit
1
Smith, The Management of Your Government , sec. 2, chap. vii.
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execution of the congressional intent with less than the amount
appropriated. An agency reporting systeir., such as was mentioned above* is
also an essential tool of executive budgeting.
5. The principle of multiple procedures in budgeting . Modern government
includes very different types of operations. Functions of everyday
administration 5 long-run construction and developmental projects; quasi-
commercial operations, such as purchase and sale of goods j or banking
operations-these require varying procedures for effective management.
Although all government functions, without exception, should be reflected
in the budget, the methods of budgeting may vary for different types of
governmental activities. Efficient management of quasi-commercial operations
requires immediate response to changing market conditions and is less
subject to definite advance programming than, for instance, are operations
of current administration. Budgeting of quasi-commercial operations may
therefore differ from budgeting of administrative activities.
6. The principle of executive budget discretion . Effective and economical
management may be hindered if appropriation items are too narrowly defined
The budget document must contain a great amount of detail for the information
of the legislature and the guidance of the executive. It is desirable,
however, that the appropriations be made for broadly defined functionsof an
agency, or subdivisions of an agency, in harmony with legislative determin-
ation of the current objectives of government. To the executive branch
should be left the determination of the precise means of operation to achieve
the purposes set forth by the law.
7. The principle of flexibility in timing . The budget should contain
provisions that permit immediate adjustment to changing economic conditions
with which fiscal policy must cope. Flexibility in timing can, for example,
be accomplished if the legislature appropriates funds for certain
construction and developmental programs for an extended period, say, of five
years. Timing of the program could then be modified by the executive in
accord with economic necessities.
8. The principle of two-way budget organization. Although budget
preparation and budget execution must be directed by the chief executive,
efficient budgeting requires the active cooperation of each agency and its
major units. There must be in each agency a budget office with functions
for that agency similar to those of the government-wide budget office. The
budgeting and programming work of the agency must be interrelated under the
direct responsibility of t^ e agency head. The established budget officer
assists his superior in the administrative control of the subdivisions of
the particular agency; he also transmits the agency's views and proposals
to the central budget bureau. Budgeting is not only a central function, but
a process that should permeate the entire administrative structure. Traffic
between the central office and the agency offices responsible for budgeting
and programming should move on a two-way rather than a one-way street.^
The principles of legislative control are centuries-old, and reflect





Budget principles of executive management are based largely on the experience
of states, municipalities, and private business organizations in the United
States.
The most obvious conflict exists between the legislative control
principle of "detailed budget specification" and the executive management
principle of "executive budget discretion. " Legislators have sometimes urged
the use of a narrowly defined itemization of appropriations, while administrators
claim that a broadly defined appropriation is more conducive to economical
management. Legislators have a good case when they say that broad appropriation
language may deprive them of their proper means of control and may permit an
administrator to violate legislative intent. The fonrser Director of the 3ureau
of the Budget, Harold D. Smith, suggests that the solution to this apparent
conflict is that legislative intent should be effectuated, not by limiting the
appropriation more severely, but by organizing budget management more
1
effectively.
Another example of apparent conflict with the historical principles
occurs in the management principle of "flexibility in timing. " Budget flexibility
with respect to timing is of decisive importance if fiscal policy is to play
its role as an instrument of economic development. The principle of "periodicity^
implies that unused appropriations should lapse or be reappropriated at the end
of each fiscal year. The purposes of budget flexibility in timing and legislative
control can be, in some measure, reconciled by the use of multiple-year
appropriations.
Another example is the apparent conflict between legislative interest
in "budget clarity" and management need for "multiple procedures in budgeting"






These conflicting interests and principles make federal budgeting in
general, and military budgeting in particular, difficult. Since legislative
control and executive management serve the same ends, a continuing attempt must
be made to reconcile those cases of apparent conflict between the purposes of
legislative control and the needs of executive management.

CHAPTER V
BUDGETING FOR KOREAN OPERATIONS
As previously noted in chapter ii, an important factor in recent
military budgets has been the policy regarding expenses for Korean operations.
Following the outbreak of Communist aggression in Korea in June, 1950, it would
be reasonable to expect that subsequent annual budget estimates to have
contained items to cover V e projected cost of combat in Korea* Actually, these
items were omitted from the annual budget estimates every year after fiscal
year 1951. Instructions were handed down to the military departments each year
to assume, in the compilation of their budget estimates, that there would be no
further combat in Kcrea after the first of the fiscal year for whiefe they were
budgeting. The real reasons for this policy are not altogether clear. As with
other items in the budget estimates, it may have been an acceptance of the
practicable difficulties cf estimating so far in advance. It may have been that
at the tine the budget estimates were being made, the Administration really
believed that the Korean yostilities v/ould have ended before the beginning of
the fiscal year for which they were budgeting. The possibility cannot be
discounted that the Administration considered estimates in the budget for Korea
an admission that an unpopular war would be continuing a year and a half later,
and that such prediction would be a political hazard. At any rate, and whatever
the reason, the actual cost of Korea was taken up in supplemental estimates and




further complicate the estimating and reviewing processes* and to put the
Military Services about a year behind in estimating and obtaining funds,
particularly for procurement purposes.

CHAPTER VI
ILIWGS FOR BUDGETARY PURPOSES
The question of agency ceilings is one that is subject to continuous
debate, particularly among naval personnel at the working level where initial
budget estimates are being prepared. Writers on the subject have taken various
approaches to the natter. Senator Paul H. Douglas gives the impression that a
ceiling is set in about June for the budget estimates then being; prepared for
1
the fiscal year starting about a year later. Senator Douglas refers to this
2
practice as "a recent change which has proved helpful. "
On the other hand, Frederick C. Mosher states that recent military
budget estimates "have largely been made without benefit, or restriction, of
3
ceilings established prior to the budget process."
In the opinion of the writer, the probable answer is that both views
are partly correct* Supporting Senator Douglas f s stand, it is probable that the
President and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, among others, have a
fairly clear idea of the tentative ceiling that they will permit.
On the other hand, the personnel at the working level, including the
bureau level in the Department of the Navy, do not know their ceiling during the
period that they are engaged in the initial preparation of their budget estimate*
1










This may, or may not, be in the best interests of efficient budget preparation.
During the period following V.orld War II, the Military Services, like
other departments, had been compelled to budget under a ceiling imposed by the
President vtnd the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. In this connection, it
is interesting to note that portion of The Forrestal Diaries wherein President
Truman is reported to have said that "about 36 billion a year of our national
income would have to go to the service of our national debt and that, of the
balance remaining, not more than one-third could be allocated to national
1
defense and this would mean the most careful screening of requirements." This
approach was qualified in following years and definitely abandoned with the
Korean aggression.
Recent budget estimates have not been so narrowly channeled into
ceilings, at least during their initial preparation. The trend has been for the
Military Services to be permitted, if not encouraged, to build up their
budgetary requirements to meet planned requirements set by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. After completion of their budget requests on this basis, they would be
subject to drastic revisions v.hen reviewed by the examiners from the Bureau of
the Budget, and the eventual ceiling or top limit imposed from above would
result in "crash" reductions in budgetary estimates.
An interesting perspective on budget estimate ceilings is contained in
testimony of Lt. Gen. George H. Decker, United States Army, Comptroller of the
Army:
General Decker. The guidance goes down in one piece, Senator. We get th<
guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and transmit that to
the field agencies. That provides the oasis.
1




Senator Flanders. Does the Secretary of Defense "tart by telling you
"Here is what you are going to be allowed to spend. How are you going to
do it?"
General Decker. No, sir; he doe« not start that way.
Senator Flanders. You say it goes down* row does it go down; in what
form?
General Decker. Ye will tell us, for instance, what forces we will be
authorized for the fiscal year. The forces are one large consideration.
Senator Flanders- goes dovn are proj. tt conies back are
appropriations?
General Decker. Estimates to support the programs; that is correct.
Senator Flanders. Budget estimates to support the programs?
General Decker. That is correct, sir.
Senator Flanders. You have never had the experience of being told
"Here is all you can have this year. How do you want to spend it?" Have you
had that experience?
General Decker. We usually hi t experience after we have submitted
a budget and it is found to be too large.
Senator Flanders* It is not the initial approach?
General DecJ.er. No, sir, it is not.
The absence of a definite ceiling on the part of an agency.; preparing
budget estimates, such as a bureau of the Department of the Navy, encourages
the "requirements" approach* The agency tends to base its budget estimates on
the basis of estimated requirements rather than that of available 1'esources.
The approach is a detailed justification for what it thinks it tray need, rather
than what it reasonably expect e ma.. ranted. This approach probably
encourages inflated budget estimates. While the mechanics of budget estimate
preparation would undo ,<e simplified, and better end-estimates would
result, if ,:n agency knew its ceiling while its budget estimates were being
prepared, it is not likely that future budget estimates will be prepared with
the benefit of ceilings established prior to the budget process. The day to day
changes in conditions, the influences of a changing foreign policy, and other
factors of our national life will probably prevent such stabilized procedures
for an indefinite pen
1
U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Preparedness Subcommittee
No. 3 of the Committee on Armed Services, : . (Senate* 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. ,
on Implementation of Title IV, National Security Act of 1947, as Amended,




Budget formulation and the preparation of budget estimates have
developed into a significant phase of Navy program management because the most
profound decisions effecting the size, scope, and timing of programs and the
use of manpower, materials, and money are made in this phase.
With each fiscal year, the preparation of budget estimates have become
increasingly complicated. Hie budget estimates must be prepared, but it is
believed that studies should be made to determine whether or not the
complications which have been imposed on budget preparations have reached or
are approaching the "make work" stage, and further to determine whether the
agencies concerned with budget estimates review have placed requirements for
justifications beyond reasonable needs. It is believed that a simpler and more
business like approach could be developed and the imposing layers of clearances
which now must be obtained for the budget estimates could be reduced. It is
further believed that it would not be too difficult for the bureaus and offices
of the Department of the Navy to estimate their cost in preparing their budget
estimates and it has been suggested that these preparation costs be stated in
the budget estimates submission in order to bring to the attention of
Congressional groups the unreasonable expense involved in budgetary procedures.
Under present operating practices of the Department of Defense, plan-




beginning of the fiscal year under consideration to allow adequate time for
planning, preparation, reviews and justifications as well as Congressional
action. At any given time* the Military Services must have under consideration
the current budget which is in the execution stage, the budget for the next
fiscal year which is in the process of preparation, review, justification, etc.,
and the budget for the succeeding year which must be in the planning and
preparation stages. It is clearly evident that the preparation of a budget for
the third year could result in a large amount of wasted effort in preparation
and revisions since the budget for the second year has not been finally
determined. It was noted in Chapter II that the assumptions and guide lines
furnished by the various echelons above the level of budget preparation
frequently were not issued on a timely basis and were subject to many revisions.
These conditions have resulted in the preparation of budgets on assumptions
made by the Military Services themselves with extensive revisions required at
later dates when higher echelon guidance was received. The preparation of the
budget estimates presented to the Congress, as differentiated from those
prepared during the budgetary process, has in many cases been compressed into
too short a period to expect well planned budgets. Every effort should be
exerted to shorten the budget cycle by the provision of firm assumptions and
guide lines prior to actual budget preparation and the elimination of the
successive detailed reviews. The budget reviews at the levels above the bureau
level in the Department of the Navy appear to be more detailed than necessary
to serve management needs at the higher levels. Greater use of sampling
techniques at the site of preparation by review authorities as opposed to
submission of voluminous detail appears worthy of study. If reviews are made
on the basis of assuring that the budget estimates and past accomplishments are
in accordance with strategic plan objectives, the requirements for detailed
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item justifications should lessen at each successively higher level, and serve
to speed up the entire review process* These changes should permit the adoption
of a realistic twelve-month budget cycle from the time budgetary assumptions
are given to the Military Services until Congressional enactment of appropriat-
ions*
The problems of budgeting for integrated programs are made more
difficult by the presently required budget time schedules and detailed review
procedures* However, the budgetary problems associated with preparing and
reviewing supporting data on employment, production schedules, expenditure
estimates, and the many other non-program parts of a budget estimate are
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